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Sandra Davis Lawrence is exceptional.
Approximately five out of the 30,000 inmates serving life
sentences in California receive parole each year.' Lawrence received
parole in 2008, after twenty-three years in prison and many parole
denials based on the severity of her commitment offense.
The California prison system is currently in federal receivership
because of overcrowding and failing to provide prisoners with
sufficient medical care.' The prison system is a mess, and the
miniscule number of life inmates receiving parole each year is
disheartening. In the California Supreme Court case that bears
Lawrence's name, the court took a step towards increasing the rate of
parole for line inmates when it clarified that an inmate cannot be
denied parole based solely on the severity of his or her commitment
offense. Of course, a future court might go a step further, and hold
that the commitment offense should not be considered in a parole
proceeding at all. Several commentators have called for this step to
be taken. In this Note, I argue that In re Lawrence draws the
appropriate line; consideration of the commitment offense is a proper
consideration that should not be eliminated from the parole process.
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Cathy Cockrell, Why Parole Doesn't Work in California, BERKELEY NEWS
CENTER, May 6, 2009, http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2009/05/06_crime.shtml.
2. Solomon Moore, Number of Life Terms Hits Record, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at
A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/23sentence.html.
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This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I examines the
foundations of parole and the California parole system. Part II
discusses the federal and state law governing the due process rights of
prisoners. Included in Part II is a discussion of In re Lawrence, the
most recent California Supreme Court opinion on due process
violations for inmates serving life sentences. Part III examines the
argument that the parole board and Governor should eliminate
consideration of an inmate's commitment offense and other
backwards-looking factors when making decisions regarding parole.
Part IV argues that California should continue to consider an
inmate's commitment offense because such consideration not only
complies with federal and state due process, but can also provide
important information about an inmate's rehabilitative progress.
I. Parole Origins and the California Parole System
A. Parole Origins
Parole is the "conditional release of convicts by a parole board
prior to the expiration of their sentence[s]."3 Parole originates from
the French word parol, which means "word of honor," in the sense of
giving one's word or promise not to take up arms after a conditional
release.4
Modern parole derives from a system established on an island
penal colony northeast of Sidney, Australia, in 1840.' Alexander
Maconochie, the colony's superintendent, implemented an open
ended sentencing structure6 and rewarded inmates with good
behavior credits that could hasten the inmate's release date . A
prisoner's sentence did not end until the prisoner achieved a certain
number of credits.8
Parole began in the United States in the late 1870s, applying to
first offenders at the Elmira Reformatory, an all-male prison in New
York.9 Inmates received credit for good behavior, which could lead
to an early release date.10 By 1900, every adult reformatory in the
3. HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE 205 (7th ed. 2000).
4. JOAN PETERSILIA, REFORMING PROBATION AND PAROLE 129 (2002).
5. ABADINSKY, supra note 3, at 206.
6. Id. Today, open ended sentences are known as indeterminate sentences.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id at 207.
10. Id.
[Vol. 37:4
Summer 2010] COMMITMENT OFFENSE AND PAROLE DETERMINATION 791
United States, save one, included some sort of inmate parole
provision.
1
According to the Supreme Court of the United States, parole in
the United States is not an ad hoc exercise of clemency. 2 Instead,
parole serves a dual purpose: First, it helps individuals reintegrate
into society as constructive individuals, and second, it alleviates
societal costs of keeping an individual in prison for his or her entire
sentencing term. 3 Parole makes release from prison a privilege that
must be earned.14
This privilege is granted rarely to inmates serving life sentences
in California. As criminologist Jonathan Simon notes, of the
approximately 30,000 California inmates serving life sentences,
approximately five are released on parole each year, while 1,000
enter."
B. California Prison/Parole Statistics
Approximately ninety-five percent of criminal prisoners in
California serve determinate sentences, which are sentences of a
specific, fixed amount of time after which prisoners are automatically
released on parole. 6 Less serious offenses, including most felonies,
are punished through determinate sentences. 7 As this Note focuses
on parole for prisoners serving indeterminate sentences, there will be
no further discussion of determinate sentences. However, it is
important to note that the vast majority of criminal inmates in
California serve determinate sentences.
The remaining five percent of criminal inmates-mostly persons
convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder, and third
strike offenses-receive and serve indeterminate sentences, often
referred to as "life sentences.' 8 According to the Sentencing Project,
11. ALEXANDER W. PISCIoTrA, BENEVOLENT REPRESSION 27 (1994).
12. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (establishing that due process imposes
certain minimum procedural requirements that must be satisfied before parole can be revoked).
13. Id.
14. PEGGY BURKE, ABOLISHING PAROLE: WHY THE EMPEROR HAS No CLOTHES
25 (1995).
15. Cockrell, supra note 1.
16. Id. (on statistics); ABADINSKY, supra note 3, at 213 (defining determinate sentence).
17. Cockrell, supra note 1.
18. Id.; see also Rachel Cotton, Time to Move On: The California Parole Board's
Fixation with the Original Crime, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 239, 245-46 n.10 (2008)
(stating indeterminate sentences are also given for the following crimes: "first degree
murder without a special circumstance, attempted first degree murder, conspiracy to
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of the 170,000 prisoners in the California prison system, 34,164 serve
life sentences.19
The California Supreme Court has explained that an
indeterminate sentence means that the Board of Parole Hearings
("the Board") "can in its discretion release the defendant on
parole., 21 While some indeterminate sentences specify a minimum
prison term2' (such as "fifteen years to life"), "other statutes
specifying indeterminate sentences do not mention a minimum
term., 22 Indeterminate sentences that do not specify a minimum term
describe the sentence only as "imprisonment in the state prison for
life with the possibility of parole" or "imprisonment in the state
prison for life.,
23
C. An Overview of the California Parole System
1. Origins of Parole in California
California adopted parole in 1893.2'  Although there is no
"constitutional or inherent right to parole" in California,25 the
California Penal Code specifies that the Board "shall set a release
date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted
offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past
convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public
safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration., 26  The
California Supreme Court has stated that California parole applicants
serving indeterminate life sentences have an expectation that they
will be granted parole "unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its
commit first degree murder, second degree murder, kidnapping and certain repeat
offenses").
19. Moore, supra note 2.
20. See People v. Jefferson, 980 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1999) (explaining the
indeterminate and determinate sentencing systems).
21. Id. The minimum prison term for first degree murder is generally twenty-five
years to life; the minimum prison term for second degree murder is generally fifteen years
to life. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Examples of crimes that qualify for this type of indeterminate sentencing are:
attempted premeditated murder, torture, and several types of kidnapping, Id.
24. JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE 45 (1993).
25. Johnson v. Estelle, No. 91-5537, (9th Cir. June 11, 1992) (citing Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b) (2009).
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discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the
circumstances specified by the statute and by regulation."'2
As discussed above, relatively few prisoners serving
indeterminate sentences in California actually receive parole.2
Under Governor George Deukmejian's administration (Republican;
1983-1991), indeterminate life inmates received parole five percent of
the time. 9 Under Governor Pete Wilson (Republican; 1991-1999),
indeterminate inmates received parole one percent of the time.
Governor Gray Davis (Democrat; 1999-2003) granted parole to six
individuals during his time in office, "five of them women whose
crimes stemmed from domestic abuse."3°  As of 2008, Governor
Schwarzenegger (Republican) had granted parole to approximately
192 life inmates.3"
The following sub-sections will discuss the key players that
determine parole in California, as well as the factors used to
determine parole suitability. In determining whether to release an
inmate on parole, public safety remains the most important
consideration.
2. The Decisionmakers: Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor
a. The Board of Parole Hearings
The Board is the administrative agency within the executive
branch authorized to grant parole and set release dates.32 The Board
can withdraw a parole date for cause and its "discretion in parole
matters has been described as great and almost unlimited."33
27. See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 654 (2002) (holding that a writ of habeas
corpus is appropriate where the denial of parole is based solely on the nature of the
commitment offense, and if a significant amount of time has passed since the crime,
evidence of the inmate's rehabilitation is uncontroverted, and the crime was not
committed in such a heinous manner as to undermine the evidence that the inmate no
longer poses a danger to society).
28. JONATHAN SIMON, GOvERNING THROUGH CRIME, 160 (2007).
29. Id.
30. Carol J. Williams, When California Denies a Murderer Parole, Should It Need a
Reason?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/13/
local/la-me-parole-suitsl3-2009decl3.
31. Maura Dolan and Michael Rothfeld, High Court Sides with Parolee, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/22/local/me-parole22/3.
32. CAL. PEN. CODE § 3041 (2009).
33. See In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d 894, 902 (1988) (holding that while the Board of
Parole Hearings may not rescind a parole date arbitrarily or capriciously, it does not abuse
its broad discretion when it has some basis in fact for the decision); see also In re Sturm, 11
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The Board is comprised of seventeen members.' Each member
is appointed by the Governor and subject to state senate
appointment. 5  The majority of Board members are former law
enforcement officers.36
b. The Governor
After the Board recommends, denies, revokes or suspends parole
for a person sentenced to an indeterminate prison term, the Governor
has thirty days to reverse or modify the decision. 7 If the Governor
decides to reverse or modify a Board decision, he must send a written
statement to the inmate specifying his reasons.3" The Governor has
held this constitutional authority to review the Board's parole
decisions since 1998.39
The Governor's review is "limited to the same considerations"
that inform the Board's decision to affirm, modify or reverse parole. '
The paramount consideration for both the Board and the Governor is
whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety and thus
may not be released on parole.41
3. Factors Used to Determine Parole Suitability
The Board's criteria in setting parole dates for individuals
convicted of murder committed after 1978 is published in Title 15 of
Cal. 3d 258, 273 (1974) (requiring a precursor to the Board of Parole Hearings to support
denials of parole with a written, definitive statement of its reasons and to communicate
this statement to the inmate concerned).
34. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, The Board of Parole
Hearings, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/BOPH/index.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2010).
35. Id.
36. See Jennifer Warren, Panel Backs Gov.'s Parole Board Picks, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2005, at B6 (describing criticisms of the board, centering on lack of professional diversity).
See also Michael Rothfeld, State parole board gets a grilling, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/ul/06/local/me-parole6 (discussing Democrat Don Perata's
challenges to Governor Schwarzenegger's appointment of law enforcement officials to the Board).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.2(a) (2009).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.2(b) (2009).
39. See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 616, 658-59. In November 1988, Californians
passed Proposition 89, amending the California Constitution to include Article V, section
8(b). Article V, section 8(b) granted the Governor constitutional authority to review the
Board's parole decisions for inmates serving indeterminate sentences. Prior to November,
1988, the power to grant or deny parole was statutory and committed exclusively to the
judgment and discretion of the Board. Id. at 659.
40. Id. at 625.
41. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1069-70 (2005).
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the California Code of Regulations. Title 15 states that decision-
makers shall consider all relevant information when determining
parole suitability. 3 Relevant information includes: the prisoner's
social history, past and present mental state, past criminal history, the
base and other commitment offenses, past and present attitude
toward the crime, any conditions of treatment or control, and any
other information that bears on the prisoner's suitability for release.'
Title 15 also includes a list of circumstances tending to show
unsuitability. Factors supporting unsuitability include: a previous
record of violence, a trivial motive for the crime, an unstable social
history, sadistic sexual offenses, severe mental problems, and
misconduct in prison.4 Further, committing the initial offense in an
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner supports unsuitability. 7
Factors that indicate "heinousness" include: attacking multiple
victims, carrying out the offense in a "dispassionate and calculated
manner," abusing, defiling, or mutilating the victim during or after
the offense, carrying out the offense in "a manner which
demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,"
or having an "inexplicable or very trivial" motive for the crime in
relation to the offense.'
H. Federal and State Law Governing the Due Process Rights
of Prisoners
California's parole review process must comport with federal and
state due process rights.49
A. Federal Due Process Law
The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that no state may deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 0
Although lawfully imprisoned inmates have fewer rights than
42. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 2402 (2009). The Governor must also abide by Title 15
criteria when deciding whether to revoke parole. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8(b).
43. Id.
44. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(b) (2009).
45. Id.
46. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(c) (2009).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Alexander Mircheff, In Re Dannenberg: California Forgoes Meaningful Judicial
Review of Parole Denials, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 907, 929-30 (2006).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ordinary citizens, "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for a crime."'" Prisoners may not
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 2
However, the rights of prisoners under the Due Process Clause can be
"subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which
they have been lawfully committed."53
When the state creates a right and recognizes that deprivation of
that right is sanctionable, the prisoner's interest is deemed within the
Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest. 4 Thus, the prisoner is
entitled to "procedures appropriate under the circumstances and
required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created
right is not arbitrarily abrogated."55 Indeed, the touchstone of federal
due process is the "protection of the individual against arbitrary
action of the government.56
The Supreme Court of the United States has concluded that
mandatory language in a state's parole scheme can create a protected
liberty interest in conditional release on parole. 7 However, in Hewitt
v. Helms, the Court stated that the Due Process Clause standing alone
confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken "within
the sentence imposed. 58 The Ninth Circuit has held that California
inmates have a liberty interest in parole. 9
Under federal law, due process is afforded to inmates denied
parole when an inmate is afforded an opportunity to be heard at the
parole hearing, and if parole is denied, the inmate is informed "in
what respect he falls short of qualifying.16°
The Ninth Circuit has warned against continued reliance on
unchanging factors to deny parole, as doing so can turn an
indeterminate sentence into an effective life sentence without the
possibility of parole." As the Ninth Circuit observed, denying parole
based solely on factors beyond the prisoner's control "runs contrary
51. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
52. Id. at 556.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 557.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 558.
57. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
58. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983).
59. Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006).
60. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
61. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003).
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to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could
result in a due process violation.
6 2
The Supreme Court requires a modicum of evidence to support a
decision to deny parole. "Requiring a modicum of evidence to
support a decision.., will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations
without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue
administrative burdens.,
63
B. California Due Process Law
The California Supreme Court has held that, with regard to
review of decisions by a prison disciplinary board, the due process
clause is satisfied, as long as there is "some basis in fact" and "some
evidence" to support the board's findings."'  "The [Board] acts
properly in determining unsuitability [for parole], and the inmate
receives all constitutional process due, if the Board provides the
requisite procedural rights, applies relevant standards, and renders a
decision supported by 'some evidence.' 6' Further, "no inmate may
be imprisoned beyond a period that is constitutionally proportionate
to the commitment offense or offenses." 66
The two seminal cases governing parole for life inmates in
California are In re Rosenkrantz and In re Dannenberg. In its 2002
Rosenkrantz decision, the California Supreme Court held that the
Governor's, as well as the Board's, decisions regarding parole are
subject to limited judicial review in order to ensure that parole
decisions "are supported by a modicum of evidence and are not
arbitrary and capricious., 67 Further, Rosenkrantz stated that the
Board and the Governor must base a decision to deny parole on
"some evidence in the record." 6  The Court stated that denying
parole based upon the circumstances of the commitment offense
could violate state due process rights when "no circumstances of the
offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent
than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for the offense.,
69
Hence, the Court stated that when evaluating whether an inmate
62. Id.
63. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456 (1985).
64. In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d at 904.
65. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071.
66. Id.
67. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 626.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 683.
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continued to pose a threat to public safety, the Board and the
Governor must consider all relevant statutory factors.7
In its 2005 Dannenberg decision, the California Supreme Court
reiterated the "some evidence" standard of review. 7' Further, the
court held that the Board need not engage in a "comparative
proportionality analysis with respect to offense[s] of similar gravity
and magnitude" in order to determine an inmate's suitability for
parole. The court also reaffirmed that the primary consideration for
the Board in determining an inmate's parole suitability is public
safety.73
In the years following Dannenberg, growing tensions "emerged
in the decisions regarding the precise contours of the 'some evidence'
standard of review." 74 In every published judicial opinion addressing
the 'some evidence' standard, the decision of the Board or the
Governor to deny or reverse a grant of parole had been founded in
part or in whole upon a finding that the inmate committed the offense
in an especially heinous manner.7 The court stated that in several
instances, "the circumstances of the underlying offense, remote in
time and attenuated by post-conviction rehabilitation, [bore] little
relationship to... whether the inmate remain[ed] a threat to public
safety."76
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit stated that in some cases, indefinite
detention based solely on an inmate's commitment offense, regardless
of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due
process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the
relevant California statutes.
77
C. In re Lawrence
In re Lawrence is the California Supreme Court's most recent
ruling on due process protections for life inmates serving
indeterminate sentences. In In re Lawrence, the court clarified that
due process is upheld in denying parole for an indeterminate inmate
70. Id. at 655.
71. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1084.
72. Id. at 1077.
73. Id. at 1084.
74. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1206 (2008).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 854 (9th. Cir. 2007).
78. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1206.
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when the circumstances of the commitment offense, when considered
in light of other facts in the record, continue to predict current
dangerousness.79
The court also addressed the arbitrary results occurring when
lower courts denied parole to indeterminate inmates based primarily
on the severity of the initial offense. 8° It found that in many cases, the
gravity of the commitment offense was the sole determinative factor
in denying parole."' The court ultimately ruled that the Board and the
Governor cannot use the initial commitment offense as the sole factor
in denying parole, unless other statutory factors also support the
parole denial.82
1. Examination of In re Lawrence
In 1971, twenty-four-year-old Sandra Davis Lawrence murdered
Rubye Williams, the wife of Ms. Lawrence's lover.83 Dr. Williams,
Ms. Lawrence's lover and a married dentist, had repeatedly promised
to divorce his wife and marry Ms. Lawrence. ' He did no such thing.
Instead, on February 13, 1971, Dr. Williams broke off his relationship
with Ms. Lawrence, leaving Ms. Lawrence "enraged."86
Ms. Lawrence immediately directed her anger at Mrs. Williams
instead of Mr. Williams, believing Mrs. Williams stood as an obstacle
to happiness with Mr. Williams. 87 Later that day, Ms. Lawrence
armed herself with a potato peeler and a pistol and drove to Dr.
Williams' office, intending to confront Mrs. Williams. 8 When Ms.
Lawrence arrived at Dr. Williams' office, Mrs. Williams was present.89
The two women began arguing and began to physically push and
struggle with each other.9° At some point, Ms. Lawrence fired at Mrs.
Williams with the pistol.91 Ms. Lawrence wounded Mrs. Williams in
79. Id. at 1191.
80. Id. at 1215.
81. Id.
82. Id.




87. Id. at 1192-93.
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the hand, arm, leg and neck and then stabbed Mrs. Williams
"repeatedly with the potato peeler."' Mrs. Williams died as a result
of the wounds inflicted by Ms. Lawrence.93
After the murder, Ms. Lawrence fled California, remaining out
of state until 1982. 4 In 1982, Ms. Lawrence voluntarily returned to
California, turned herself in to authorities and declined a plea bargain
where she would have served two years in prison.95 In 1983, the case
went to trial and a jury convicted Ms. Lawrence of first degree
murder, sentencing her to life in prison.96 A minimum parole
eligibility date was set for November 1990.9 Although Ms. Lawrence
initially pled not guilty and initially denied her role as murderer, she
later accepted full responsibility for the crime."
Aside from two minor administrative violations, Ms. Lawrence
served as a model inmate throughout the twenty-three years spent in
state prison. She incurred no serious discipline violations. 9' She lived
in housing reserved for other discipline-free inmates, she worked as a
plumber for the prison, she participated in tutoring programs,
physical fitness programs, Toastmasters International, and the
Friends Outside parenting program.100
Ms. Lawrence's psychological reports detail incremental
acceptance and understanding of her crime.'O Her 1984 psychological
report stated that she was "narcissistic, lacked emotional insight,
repressed her emotions, and avoided reality through excessive
activity. ' '  However, by 1989, psychological reports "provided a
positive review of [Ms. Lawrence's] health, intelligence, and overall
psychological condition."'0 3 Indeed, when reviewing Ms. Lawrence's
psychiatric history, the In re Lawrence court found that five





96. Id. at 1194. At the time of Ms. Lawrence's sentencing, life in prison was the
"standard statutory penalty for such offenses committed prior to November 8, 1978." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. 4th at 1195-98.
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concluded that Ms. Lawrence did not represent a significant danger to
public safety."9
The Board first recommended Ms. Lawrence for parole in 1993,
finding that Ms. Lawrence committed the crime "as a result of
significant stress, and had demonstrated a motivation, growth, and a
greater understanding of herself and the crime."'' 5 Governor Pete
Wilson reversed the recommendation, finding public safety might
require a longer incarceration and that Ms. Lawrence had yet to serve
a punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the crime.0° In
November 2002, the Board again recommended Ms. Lawrence for
parole.'" Governor Gray Davis reversed the recommendation in
2003208
In May 2004, the Board recommended Ms. Lawrence for parole
for the third time, finding that Ms. Lawrence had no serious rule
violations, did not pose a danger to public safety and understood the
seriousness of her crime." Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
reversed, stating that Ms. Lawrence would pose a danger to public
safety because of the nature of her commitment offense."0  The
Governor found that Ms. Lawrence committed a vicious crime for "an
'incredibly petty' reason."''
The Board recommended parole for the fourth time in August
2005.112 By this time, Ms. Lawrence had obtained a master's degree in
business administration, served as a physical fitness trainer for
prisoners, updated her computer skills, participated in several social
programs geared towards rehabilitation, and was accepted into a
prisoner reentry program. 3 In its recommendation, the Board again
emphasized that Ms. Lawrence committed murder out of stress and
her possibility of recidivism was low due to her maturation and
growth."4 However, in January 2006, the Governor again reversed
104. Id. at 1195.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1196.
107. Id.





113. Id. at 1197-98.
114. Id. at 1197.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the Board's decision."1 While lauding Ms. Lawrence's vocational and
rehabilitative training, Governor Schwarzenegger refused parole
based on the gravity of Ms. Lawrence's commitment offense. "6
Ms. Lawrence filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus."7 The
court of appeal, in a split decision, reversed the Governor."8 The
majority found that the Governor's decision was not supported by
some evidence indicating Ms. Lawrence posed an unreasonable threat
to public safety if released on parole."9 The court of appeal reinstated
parole to Ms. Lawrence.2 Ms. Lawrence was paroled on July 11,
2007.121
In deciding In re Lawrence, the California Supreme Court
rejected the Attorney General's argument that the aggravated
circumstances of a commitment offense inherently assess current
dangerousness and that the existence of some evidence demonstrating
the that offense was aggravated beyond the minimum elements of the
offense is sufficient to support the conclusion that an inmate is
currently dangerous.2 2 The California Supreme Court found that it is
not the circumstance that the crime is particularly egregious that
makes a prisoner unsuitable for parole. 123 Rather, it is the implication
of future dangerousness deriving from the inmate committing the
crime.12 ' Because the parole decisions consist of predictions
concerning the future, "rarely (if ever) will the existence of a single
isolated fact... support or refute [a parole] decision.'
125
The court stated that consideration of the commitment offense is
important because it testifies to the fact that the prisoner was a
danger to the public at or around the time of his or her commission of
the offense.' 26  Absent affirmative evidence of a change in the
prisoner's demeanor and mental state, the circumstances of the
commitment offense may continue to be probative of the prisoner's
115. Id. at 1199.
116. Id. at 1200.
117. Id. at 1201.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1200-01.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1201.
122. Id. at 1213.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1214.
126. Id. at 1219.
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dangerousness for some time in the future.27 At some point however,
affirmative evidence may prove that commitment offense no longer
constitutes a reliable indicator of the prisoner's current
dangerousness."
11. Argument In Favor of Prohibiting Consideration of the
Commitment Offense
Two law review articles written before In re Lawrence advocate
eliminating the Board's ability to deny parole based on the
circumstances of the commitment offense. 9 In his article California's
Inequitable Parole System, Daniel Weiss explores several flaws within
the system and recommends three major reforms.3 In particular,
Weiss suggests that the Board should eliminate consideration of any
retributive, backward-looking factors when considering parole
suitability. 3' Under Weiss' approach, the Board could consider only
"rehabilitative, forward-looking factors,' 32 such as "treatment,
release plans, job skills, letters of support, and psychological
reports.' ' 133 However, the Board could not consider the commitment
offense or an inmate's prior criminal history.
Weiss also argues that the Board should consider only forward-
looking factors because it lacks firsthand information about the
commitment offense and the original trial, but does possess firsthand
knowledge of the rehabilitated inmate.3 3 Further, Weiss argues that
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Daniel Weiss, Note, California's Inequitable Parole System: A Proposal to
Reestablish Fairness, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1588, 1599 (2005); Christopher Mock, Note,
Parole Suitability Determinations in California: Ambiguous, Arbitrary and Illusory, 17 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 889, 909 (2008). See also Rachel Cotton, Time to Move On:
The California Parole Board's Fixation with the Original Crime, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
239, 245-46 (2008) (arguing that California should place less of an emphasis on the
commitment offense).
130. Weiss, supra note 129, at 1576. Weiss' three suggestions for reform are: (1) a
legislative restructuring of the sentencing matrix that would permit judicial discretion in
deviating from the matrix in certain circumstances; (2) the Board considering only
forward-looking factors for purposes of parole suitability; (3) eliminating the Governor's
ability to reverse a Board determination of parole suitability. Id.
131. Id. at 1599. Weiss does not discuss whether the Governor should eliminate
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the Board should only concern itself with inmates' present states of
mind, rather than the inmate's state of mind at the time of the original
offense.'36 Weiss writes, "[a]llowing the Board to focus on backward-
looking factors corrupts its view as to whether the inmate, in the
present, can [currently] operate as a law-abiding person in society.',
3 7
If the Board considered only rehabilitative factors, inmates could
"control their potential for parole by controlling their rehabilitation,
rather than waiting for the Board to determine that they have served
the appropriate amount of time for their crimes.,
13 8
In a 2008 law review article, Christopher Mock concurs with
Weiss' argument that the Board should only consider rehabilitative
factors in establishing parole suitability.9 Mock argues that severity
of the commitment offense is an unreliable predictor of future
violence.14° Citing several scientific studies, Mock argues that a lack
of correlation between the circumstances of an inmate's commitment
offense and the inmate's future risk of danger to public safety
supports eliminating consideration of the commitment offense from
determinations of parole suitability. 4' Mock argues that public safety,
the overarching consideration of whether to grant parole, is not
furthered by consideration of a commitment offense.4 2
IV. Argument Against Eliminating Consideration of the
Commitment Offense
Eliminating consideration of the commitment offense post-In re
Lawrence is a mistake for three reasons. First, that decision clarifies
that consideration of the commitment offense, when balanced by
other statutory factors, comports with due process. Second,
consideration of the commitment offense, in some cases, may
contribute to an inmate's due process protections. Finally, the Board
lacks sufficient firsthand knowledge of the inmate to warrant
eliminating consideration of the commitment offense.
136. Id. at 1599-1600.
137. Id. at 1600.
138. Id. at 1601. Weiss also advanced a "double counting" argument, referring to
situations in which the Parole Board of the Governor extend the inmate's incarceration
beyond the judicially imposed minimum term solely on the severity of the commitment
offense. This is no longer permissible under Lawrence. Id.
139. Mock, supra note 129, at 911.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 909-11.
142. Id. at 911.
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A. There Is No Due Process Rationale for Eliminating Consideration of
the Commitment Offense
In re Lawrence does not perfect the grossly imperfect California
parole system. It does, however, clarify that there is no due process
rationale for elm;;-ting consideration of the commitment offense.
The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual
against the arbitrary action of the government. 143 In re Lawrence
solidifies an inmate's protection against an arbitrary denial of parole
by insisting that multiple factors support a denial of parole.1" As long
as a parole denial meets the requirements of In re Lawrence and an
inmate denied parole is afforded an opportunity to be heard at parole
hearings and an explanation of why he fell short of qualifying, the
process comports with federal and state due process. '
In re Lawrence also protects against constant parole denials
based on an unchanging factor beyond the inmate's control.
146
Although the inmate cannot change the circumstances of the initial
commitment offense, courts must balance the commitment offense
against factors the individual can change, such as behavior while
institutionalized, stable social relationships, and that rehabilitative
activities suggest an enhanced ability to function within the law upon
release.47
As long as parole denial or revocation is supported by factors in
addition to the gravity of the initial commitment offense, the parole
denial or revocation falls within the similar "modicum of evidence"
and "some evidence" standards required by the Supreme Court and
the California Supreme Court, respectively.9' Also, judicial review
provides a final check on the constitutionality of post-In re-Lawrence
parole revocations and denials." 9 Therefore, there is no due process
rationale for eliminating consideration of the commitment offense
post-In-re-Lawrence.
143. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555.
144. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1221.
145. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.
146. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (cautioning against
parole denials based solely on an unchanging factor beyond an inmate's control).
147. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402 (2009).
148. In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d at 904; In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205.
149. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071.
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B. Eliminating Consideration of the Commitment Offense and Other
Backward Looking Factors Could Prove Prejudicial or Harmful
Mock argues that an inmate's commitment offense should not be
considered because it does not accurately predict an inmate's future
risk to the public." This assertion is limited: It considers the obvious
case of a dangerous crime creating the implication that more
dangerous crimes are to come. However, consideration of the
commitment offense can be more than a simplistic propensity
assessment. Eliminating consideration of the commitment offense
would hurt inmates whose commitment offenses establish unique
circumstances unlikely to again occur. In In re Lawrence, for
example, the circumstances surrounding Ms. Lawrence's commitment
offense contributed to the Board's parole recommendation."' The
Board emphasized that a twenty-four-year-old Ms. Lawrence killed
her lover's wife out of stress and misdirected anger.52 When coupled
with Ms. Lawrence's rehabilitative gains, it became clear that the
unique brew of stress, youth, and misdirected anger present during
the commitment offense were highly unlikely to again lead Ms.
Lawrence to murder.'53 Thus, consideration of the circumstances
surrounding Ms. Lawrence's commitment offense helped the Board,
and the California Supreme Court, determine that Ms. Lawrence
posed an unlikely danger to society and met parole suitability
requirements.
Also, propensity is not the only way a commitment offense can
bear on current dangerousness. Knowledge of the commitment
offense is necessary to gauge whether an inmate has been sufficiently
rehabilitated. Further, it assists in establishing factors and programs
that should be stressed during an inmate's rehabilitation period. Ms.
Lawrence, for example, would benefit from a rehabilitation focusing
on her ability to handle stress and engage in mature relationships. In
contrast, another inmate with a history of violence who killed
someone after a bar brawl would benefit more from a series of
violence prevention classes throughout the course of her
rehabilitation.
150. Mock, supra note 129, at 911.
151. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1225 (finding that Ms. Lawrence "committed
the murder while under the stress of an emotional love triangle").
152. Id. at 1225-26.
153. Id. at 1225.
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Furthermore, the commitment offense is only one of several
backward-looking considerations at issue. Eliminating consideration
of all backward looking offenses would remove the following factors
from consideration: previous record of violence, previous
psychological experiences, unstable social history, sadistic sexual
offenses committed prior to the inmate's current prison term, and
motivation for the original crime."' It is one thing to observe that a
single crime does not mark a person as a violent danger for life. It is
another to blind the Board to the full scope of an inmate's past.
Psychological issues develop through a myriad of past experiences.
For public safety reasons, the Board and the Governor should
consider an inmate's experience of sexual offenses, mental illness, and
psychological experiences as totality of the circumstances. When
consideration of such factors is restricted to beginning at the point the
inmate first started serving his sentence, the Board and the Governor
lose valuable information on the workings of an inmate's mind and
factors that may influence an inmate's threat to public safety. Indeed,
it seems especially misguided to limit the analysis to the inmate's
conduct while in the controlled atmosphere of prison, when the
critical determination is whether an inmate will pose a danger once he
or she gets out. Also, proponents of eliminating the commitment
offense fail to explain to what extent eliminating consideration of the
commitment offense would affect eliminating affirmative defenses for
indeterminate inmates. For example, would elimination of the
commitment offense also bar information concerning a murderer's
affirmative defense as the subject of domestic abuse?
In summary, consideration of the commitment offense is
necessary to gauge the scope of rehabilitative work and gauge a full
understanding of the prisoner.
C. The Board Lacks Sufficient First-Hand Knowledge of an Inmate to
Warrant Eliminating Consideration of the Commitment Offense
Weiss argues that the Board should consider only rehabilitative,
forward-looking factors because it lacks firsthand information about
the commitment offense and the original trial, but it does possess
firsthand knowledge of the rehabilitated inmate.' This argument is
weak. The Board's primary firsthand interaction with the inmate
occurs when the inmate sits in front of the Board at hearings. The
154. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402 (2009).
155. Weiss, supra note 129, at 1599.
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Board does not see the inmate on a day-to-day basis and Board
members do not individually observe and write reports on the
inmates.
Conclusion
Pre-In re Lawrence law may have resulted in due process
violations by allowing the Board or the Governor to deny parole in all
instances a commitment offense was found particularly egregious. In
re Lawrence provides a floor under which the Board and the
Governor, in deciding to grant or revoke parole, cannot fall below.
Under In re Lawrence, an inmate's due process rights are violated if
the Board or the Governor relies solely on the circumstances of the
underlying commitment offense in denying parole, when other
statutory considerations support parole. As such, In re Lawrence
negates the argument that the Board and the Governor should
consider only rehabilitative and forward looking factors in making
parole determinations. Maintaining consideration of the commitment
offense and other backward-looking factors when deciding parole is
important for inmates whose commitment offenses establish unique
circumstances unlikely to again occur.
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